The data gathered were analyzed using content analysis. Auditors-general and other independent officers continue to question the constitutional inconsistencies of these changes, sometimes at grave risk to their very existence. Estudiamos la experiencia de tal tipo de comité, el Comité de Cuentas Públicas y Presupuesto del estado de Victoria, Australia, a tiempo que un gobierno reformista en turno implementó diversas medidas basadas en los principios de la nueva gerencia pública. Reformist governments in pursuing their own political interests have been prepared to put aside enduring understandings of constitutional accountability which emphasize the well-being of the entire community as the manifestation of substantive citizenship and replace it with more easily metricated forms of accountability. It includes a multi-dimensional analysis of the results of reform, and a chapter reflecting on the dynamic relationship between management reform and politics. In doing so, we analyze survey data from 51 Commonwealth countries collected by the World Bank Institute in 2002. Extensive appendices provide an invaluable information resource for students.
For further information, please contact: Hon Akierra M D Missick, Chair Public Accounts Committee House of Assembly Grand Turk. An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Sixth Workshop of Parliamentary Scholars and Parliamentarians, Wroxton College, 31 July—1 August 2004. Findings Performance audit growth has continued but not always consistently over time and across audit jurisdictions. Parliamentary Oversight—Committees and Relationships: Review of Recent Developments in Legislative Oversight in Britain and Australia, with Special Reference to Public Accounts Committees. Accessed on June 30, 2009. The paper examines the current role of the Indonesian Public Accounts Committee and the relationship between the Committee and the Supreme Audit Institution.
Second, it examines whether the reforms can be justified on the basis of the inefficient performance of the auditor-general, or of the implications of economic theory. Discusses the implications of these findings for further research. We conclude by exploring features of New Public Man- agement reforms that may have contributed to paradoxical effects and argue that the analysis of such paradoxes can help advance administrative science and the understanding of public sector reform. What makes organizations so similar? Empirical data has been brought up to date, so as to cover many key developments of the last few years. We describe three isomorphic processes--coercive, mimetic, and normative-leading to this outcome. The legitimacy of representative democracy was compromised when governments strayed from this norm. We examine the experience of such a committee, the Public Accounts and Estimates Committee in the State of Victoria, Australia, at a time when a reforming state government implemented wide-ranging reforms based on the principles of new public management.
Even as newly democratic parliaments throughout the world experiment with more elaborate committee structures, those with older, highly developed committee systems are reaching for more varied and flexible alternatives. Yet, less attention has been paid to whether legislative oversight has any impact on the functioning of a political system and, if so, what kind of impact it has. As ''New Public Management'' enters middle age, scholarly attention has moved to some degree from descriptive mapping and a priori critiques to the analysis of surprises and paradoxes associated with recent and contemporary public service reforms. We argue that the strength of the committee can be understood by using a historical institutionalism perspective. Social implications As an audit technology now well-embedded in the public sector accountability setting, it offers potential insights into matters of local, state and national importance for parliament and the public, but exhibits variable underlying drivers, agendas and styles of presentation that have the capacity to enhance or detract from the public interest. Performance auditing has also increased the potential for Auditors-General to clash openly with elected governments, though for the most part they confine their scrutiny to the activities of public servants. This paper examines the various ways in which the Audit Office has facilitated or challenged the public sector reforms in New Zealand.
Accountability is fundamental to the proper functioning of a democratic system of government Funnell and Cooper 1998; Watson 2004. Despite auditor discourse concerning backstage performance audit intentions being strongly focussed on evaluating programme outcomes, published front stage reports retain a strong control focus. This analysis of the purposes of representation provided the intellectual framework for an ambitious restructuring of the Westminster model, most notably an unprecedented reduction in the size of the provincial legislature, as well as the elimination of the Legislature's historic control over its own electoral boundaries and composition. Some standard analytic lenses for examining such paradoxes, explored here, are the Mertonian tradition of analyzing unintended effects of social interventions, cultural theories of surprise, and the analysis of discontinuities and unexpected couplings in the operation of complex systems, though the New Public Management literature to date has employed the first lens more intensively than the other two. The Conservatives espoused a vision of parliamentary representation, rooted in neo-liberal ideology, which held that the primary obligation of elected members was to respect their constituents' interest as taxpayers, superseding attention to any of their other multiple identities traditionally considered to be worthy of representation in the Legislature.
It was established to review the expenditure of government and ensure public funds are spent in an effective, efficient, economical and ethical manner James 2009; Jones and Jacobs 2009;Khan and Hoque 2016. The paper concludes, as widely contended at the time, that the audit reforms undertaken in Victoria in 1998 were politically and not economically motivated. In each case, it is not a question of 'in with the new, out with the old', but of 'in with the new alongside key components of the old'. Their role is to scrutinise public expenditure on behalf of parliament, and they usually work closely with the Auditor-General. The Public Accounts Committee is an arms-length of the Indonesian Parliament in exercising the oversight function on government accountability.
Documentary analysis and interview methods are employed. Two countries have been added to the comparison making twelve countries in all and a much fuller treatment has been provided of the European Commission including a commentary on the recent reforms led by Vice-President Kinnock. The right to conduct audits was stripped from the auditor-general and transferred to a statutory body, the principal function of which was to compete with private audit firms for the conduct of all financial statement and performance audits of all government bodies. First, it considers whether the public accountability obligations of auditors-general can be maintained under a regime in which auditors-general conduct no audits. This makes traditional hierarchical forms of accountability difficult to maintain and poses new challenges for accounting and audit. The Changing Role of Parliamentary Committees in Victoria, 1968-1996.
The rise of New Public Management is often seen as undermining traditional systems of parliamentary financial oversight. The study used documentary evidence, interviews and survey questions to elicit data from participant drawn from Yobe State House of Assembly. Parliaments, which according to the then prevalent scholarly literature were expected to decline in significance in the decades of the 1960s and 1970s, actually have developed new and vital political roles and, in recent decades, have innovated in their institutional structure — most recurrently in their newly organised or invigorated parliamentary committees. Accessed on June 30, 2009. Uno de los más frecuentes en dichos sistemas es el Comité de Cuentas Públicas, encontrado en la mayoría de los sistemas parlamentarios Westminster. This would indicate that the primary objective in the establishment of both these committees was legitimation rather than control.